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Microscopic modeling and analysis of collective decision
making: equality bias leads suboptimal solutions
Pierluigi Vellucci1 and Mattia Zanella2
Abstract: We discuss a novel microscopic model for collective decision-making
interacting multi-agent systems. In particular we are interested in modeling a
well known phenomena in the experimental literature called equality bias, where
agents tend to behave in the same way as if they were as good, or as bad, as their
partner. We analyze the introduced problem and we prove the suboptimality of the
collective decision-making in the presence of equality bias. Numerical experiments
are addressed in the last section.
1. Introduction
Several experimental works on group psychology has been done in recent years
in order to observe unexpected dysfunctional behaviors in decision-making commu-
nities, see [7, 20, 23, 24] and the references therein. Usual example are the group-
think, a collective phenomena whereby people try to minimize internal conflicts for
reaching consensus to the detriment of the common good, the Dunning-Kruger ef-
fect, regarding an overestimation of personal competence of unskilled people, and
the equality bias, whereby people behave as if they are as good, or as bad as their
partner. In the following we will focus on this latter aspect of decision–making
systems.
A valuable improvement on the direction of understanding the emergence of
the equality bias has been done in [24]. Here, authors asked how people deal
with individual differences in competence in the context of a collective perceptual
decision-making task, developing a metric for estimating how participants weight
their partner’s opinion relative to their own. Empirical experiments, replicated
across three slightly different countries like Denmark, Iran, and China, show how
participants assigned nearly equal weights to each other’s opinions regardless of
the real differences in their competence. The results show that the equality bias is
particularly costly for a group when a competence gap separates its members.
Drawing inspiration by these recent experimental results, and by the mathe-
matical set-up introduced in the recent works [2, 4, 6, 8, 15, 27, 28, 31], we
consider here a microscopic model taking into account the influence of the com-
petence in collective decision-making tasks for systems of interacting agents. This
works follows the recent study of the authors [29] where the decision-making task
is discussed at the kinetic level.
The approach proposed in this paper is based on the Laplacian matrix of the
connectivity graph and is inspired by classical works on self–organization [15, 30].
With reference to the experimental literature we introduce competence–based inter-
action functions describing the maximum competence (MC) and the equality bias
(EB) case. In particular, the MC model sketches the case in which the emerging
decision coincides with the one of the most competent agent. On the other hand the
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2EB model should deal with the complementary case. Based on a simplified com-
munication coefficients, we derive the asymptotic convergence of the overall system
for the decision models. A key feature of present modeling is the evolution of the
competence variable, whose dynamics takes into account the social background of
the single agent and the possibility to improve specific competences during inter-
actions with more competent agents, see [8, 27]. At the continuous level it has
been showed in [29] how the variation of the mean opinion of agents with given
competence follows the choice of the most competent agents in the MC case. The
present approach is based on the explicit derivation of eigenvalues of the system.
The present manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly re-
view some microscopic models for alignment dynamics, we introduce here a specific
model for decision and competence. Then we discuss two main models for the col-
lective decision-making, the mentioned MC model and the EB model. In Section
3 we analyze the main properties of the model and we show how the equality bias
leads the system of agents toward suboptimal collective decisions, computing the
eigenvalues of the aforementioned Laplacian matrix and proving that the collec-
tive decision-making in the presence of equality bias is suboptimal for each t > 0.
Finally, in Section 4 we address numerical experiments based on the introduced
model.
2. Description of the model
In this section we discuss some modeling aspects of second order microscopic
model for decision-making dynamics. Our mathematical approach follows the set-
up of several recent works on opinion dynamics, see [4, 8, 15, 31] and the references
therein. These class of models gained deepest attention in scientific research in the
last decade thanks to their countless applications in biology, socio-economic sciences
and control theory [2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 12, 11, 14, 17, 22, 28].
2.1. Microscopic models for the collective behavior. Without intending
to review whole literature, we introduce some well-known microscopic models de-
scribing particular aspects of the aggregate motion of a finite system of interacting
agents. We focus in particular on alignment-type dynamics.
We are interested in studying the dynamics of N ∈ N individuals with the
following general structure at time t ∈ R+
(2.1)

x˙i = f(xi, wi), i = 1, . . . , N,
w˙i = S(xi) +
1
αi
N∑
j=1
P (xi, xj ;wi, wj)(wj − wi),
where (xi, wi) ∈ R2d for each t ≥ 0, S(·) is a self-propelling term and P (·, ·; ·, ·)
is a general interaction function depending on both the considered variables. In
(2.1) we introduced a function f : R2d → Rd, it assumes the form f(xi, wi) = wi in
case of flocking systems, in this case xi, wi are the space and velocity variables the
ith agent. It may describe a wider class of processes which will be specified later on.
We exemplify the structure of flocking systems by presenting the Cucker-Smale
(CS) model and the Motsch-Tadmor (MT) model. In the classic CS model each
agent adjusts its velocity by adding a weighted average of the differences of its
3velocity with those of all the other agents. Therefore, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we
consider a symmetric interaction function of the form
(2.2) P (xi, xj ;wi, wj) = p(‖xi − xj‖2)
depending on the Euclidean distance between agents and the constant scaling αi =
N , see [15]. In particular the typical choice is the following
p(‖xi − xj‖2) = K
(ζ2 + ‖xi − xj‖2)γ ,
with K, ζ > 0 and γ ≥ 0. Without considering self-propelling terms, i.e. S(·) ≡ 0,
it has been shown how under these assumptions that the resulting initial value
problems is well-posed: mass and momentum are preserved and the solution has
compact support for both position and velocity [9, 10, 11]. Further, in the CS
model unconditional alignment emerges for γ ≤ 1/2 and the velocity support
collapses exponentially to a single point and the system holds the same disposition.
An example of non-symmetric interactions in flocking systems is given by the
MT model [25, 26]. Here the alignment is based on the relative influence between
the system of agents, therefore we consider an interaction of the form introduced
in (2.2) whereas the scaling factors αi > 0 are given by
αi =
∑
j 6=i
P (‖xi − xj‖2).
With this definition the dynamics looses any property of symmetry of the CS model,
linking the initial value problem (2.1) to more sophisticated models where the ith
agent may interact with the jth agent but not vice versa, for example leader-follower
models as well as limited perception models [16].
2.2. A competence-based model for collective decision-making. We
are interested to describe the coupled evolution of decisions and competence in a
system of N ∈ N interacting agents. Each agent is endowed with two quantities
(xi, wi) representing its competence and decision respectively, where xi ∈ X ⊆ R+
and wi ∈ [−1, 1] = I, where ±1 denote two opposite possible decisions of an agent.
One of the main factors influencing the evolution of the competence variable is
the social background in which individuals lives. It is therefore natural to assume
that competence is partially inherited from the environment with the possibility to
learn specific competences by interacting with more competent agents [8, 27, 28,
29].
Real experiments have been done in the psychology literature in order to define
the impact of the competence on a group decision-making, see [7, 23, 24, 21] and
the references therein. Competence is generally associated to the predisposition to
listen and give value to the other opinions. The higher this quality, greater is the
ability to value other opinions. Vice versa, a person unwilling to listen and dialogue
is usually marked by not competent. An emergent phenomenon in group decision-
making is called equality bias, that is a misjudgement of personal competence of
unskilled people during the exchange of informations, which goes hand in hand with
the tendency of the most skilled individuals to underestimate their competence.
4From the general structure introduced in the previous section we consider the
evolution in [0, Tf ], Tf > 0 of the following system of differential equations
(2.3)

x˙i =
N∑
j=1
λ(xi, xj)(xj − xi) + λB(xi)z, i = 1, . . . , N
w˙i =
1
N
N∑
j=1
P (xi, xj ;wi, wj) (wj − wi) ,
where z ∈ R+ is a the degree of competence achieved from the background at each
interaction, having distribution C(z) and bounded mean mB∫
R+
C(z)dz = 1,
∫
R+
zC(z)dz = mB .
Further, λB(·) quantifies the expertise gained from the background and λ(·, ·)
weights the exchange of competence between individuals. A possible choice for
the function λ(·, ·) is λ(xi, xj) = const. > 0 if xi < xj and λ(xi, xj) = 0 elsewhere.
In the above system we introduced the interaction function 0 ≤ P (wi, wj ;xi, xj) ≤ 1
depending on both the decisions and competence of the interacting agents.
More realistic models may be obtained by adding to (2.3) decision depen-
dent noise terms modeling self-thinking processes and characterized by a function
D(xi, wi) ∈ [0, 1] generally called local relevance of the diffusion for a given decision
and competence.
A possible choice for the interaction function is the following
(2.4) P (wi, wj ;xi, xj) = Q(wi, wj)R(xi, xj),
where 0 ≤ Q(·, ·) ≤ 1 is the compromise propensity and 0 ≤ R(·, ·) ≤ 1 which takes
into account the agents’ competence. Let us assume Q(wi, wj) ≡ 1, we adopt the
following notation for the square matrix RN ∈ MatN (R+)
(2.5) rij = R(xi, xj), for all i, j = 1, . . . , N .
We further define the diagonal square matrix DN ∈ MatN (R+)
(2.6) (DN )ij =
{∑N
j=1 rij if i = j
0 if i 6= j,
for all i, j = 1, . . . , N . Then we can rewrite (2.3) as follows
w˙i = −
 1
N
N∑
j=1
rij
wi(t) + 1
N
N∑
j=1
rijwj(t),
= − 1
N
[DNw(t)]i +
1
N
[RNw(t)]i ,
= − 1
N
[LNw(t)]i .
being
(2.7) LN = DN −RN ;
where LN is usually called Laplacian matrix of a graph.
52.3. Collective decision-making under equality bias. In the following we
consider two main models of decision-making inspired by real experiments [7, 24].
The first model takes into account the competence of individuals: at each inter-
action the prevailing decision coincides with the one of the system with maximum
competence. We will refer to this model as maximum competence model (MC). In
the present setting the MC model may be obtained by considering the Heaviside-
type interaction function R(xi, xj) =: RMC(xi, xj)
RMC(x, x∗) =

1 x < x∗
1/2 x = x∗
0 x > x∗.
The function RMC(·, ·) may be approximated through a smoothed continuous ver-
sion of the MC model (cMC)
(2.8) RcMC(xi, xj) =
1
1 + ec(xi−xj)
,
with c >> 1.
In order to reproduce the cited equality bias we consider here a competence
based interaction function R(xi, xj) =: REB(xi, xj) with the following properties:
if the competences xi and xj are very close together, i.e. in the homogeneous case,
there are not appreciable changes in the dynamics of the model, while if xi and
xj sensibly differ we have REB(xi, xj) ' 1. An example is given by the sigmoid
function
(2.9) REB(xi, xj) =
1
1 + e−c(xi−xj)
,
with c > 0 a given constant. We depict in Figure 1 the functions RcMC(·, ·) and
REB(·, ·) defined in (2.8)-(2.9) for several choices of the constant c > 0.
Observe how, both in the EB and cMC cases, the element of the matrix RN
introduced in (2.5) is such that
rij = 1− rji, i, j = 1, . . . , N.
The problem to study the eigenvalues distribution of the matrix LN is not in
general an easy task, and it depends on the connectivity coefficients index of the
model. Under suitable assumptions, it has been addressed in [15] and [30]. In
our case the Laplacian matrix is not symmetric and a strategy similar to [15]
cannot be used. For this reason, in the following, we will face the problem of the
eigenvalues distribution under simplifying assumptions.
We introduce the concepts of collective decision [18, 19].
Definition 1 (Collective decision). Let us consider a system of N ∈ N agents
with competence and opinion (xi, wi)i=1,...,N . We define the collective decision of
the system the quantity
w¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
wi.
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Figure 1. We depict the functions RcMC(xi, xj) and REB(xi, xj)
defined in (2.8) and (2.9) for several choices of the constant c > 0.
In the (cMC) case (left) in the half-plane xi > xj the ith agent
is scarcely influenced by the agent jth, the less competent one.
On the other hand, in the (EB) case (right) we have the opposite
situation in the half-plane xi > xj and the less competent are not
influenced by the more skilled agents.
Definition 2 (Optimal collective decision). Let (xi, wi)i=1,...,N be a system of
N ∈ N interacting agents. A collective decision is said to be optimal if
w¯ = wk, such that xk = max
i=1,...,N
xi.
We have introduced a definition of optimal decision which is rather different
from the one in [29]. In the cited work the optimal decision of the interacting
system is suggested by external factors through and embedded in the dynamics
through a self–propulsion term, whereas the introduced optimal decision depends
on the maximal competence of the considered system of agents and is defined a
priori as the decision of the most competent agents of the system.
In the rest of the paper we focus on two main situations described by the
following assumptions:
Assumption 3. If the competence of the agents does not enter in the dynamics
we have
rij = r for all i, j = 1, . . . , N.
Assumption 4. The system of agents is divided in two populations, competent
and incompetent agents, belonging to the sets S and U respectively. The interaction
function in the MC case reads
rij =

0 i ∈ S, j ∈ U
1
2
i, j ∈ S or i, j ∈ U
1 i ∈ U, j ∈ S,
whereas it simplifies in the EB case as follows
rij =

1 i ∈ S, j ∈ U
1
2
i, j ∈ S or i, j ∈ U
0 i ∈ U, j ∈ S.
7The Assumption 3 describes the case in which the competences of individuals of
the whole group does not depend on time and are very close together, i.e. xi ≈ xj for
all i, j = 1, . . . , N . We will analyze this simple case by assuming from r = 1/2. On
the other hand Assumption 4 define simplified interaction rules, which are coherent
with RMC(·, ·) and REB(·, ·) for c  1. Observe how in this case the evolution of
the competence variable does not permit the decoupling of the introduced decision
dynamics and to derive explicit stationary decisions of the system. In the following
we derive the general structure of the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix showing
how the introduction of these interaction rules leads the agents toward an optimal
or suboptimal collective decisions respectively in the MC and EB cases.
3. Properties of the model
In this section we investigate the structure and properties of the matrices de-
fined in the last section.
Proposition 5. Let us consider the matrices LN = DN−RN defined in (2.5)-
(2.6). Then we have:
(i) The entries of LN are given by
(3.1) (LN )ij =

(1− δi1)
(
i− 1−
i−1∑
k=1
rki
)
+ (1− δiN )
N∑
k=i+1
rik if i = j
−rij if i < j
rji − 1 if i > j
where
δij =
{
0 i 6= j,
1 i = j.
is the Kronecker’s delta function. Further, the expression of LN at the
may be written in terms of LN−1 as follows
(3.2) LN =
(
LN−1 +HN−1 −−→h TN−1−→
h N−1 −−→1 N−1 N − 1−
∑N−1
i=1 ri,N
)
where L1 = (0) and we introduced the terms −→h N−1 = [riN ]i=1,...,N−1,−→
1 N−1 = [1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
] and the diagonal matrix HN−1 ∈ MatN−1([0, 1]) de-
fined as
(3.3) (HN−1)ij =
{
riN if i = j,
0 otherwise .
(ii) The matrix LN is singular.
(iii) For N ≥ 2, tr(LN ) = N(N−1)2 .
Proof. (i) By induction, in the case N = 2 we have:
L2 =
(
r11 + r12 0
0 r21 + r22
)
−
(
r11 r12
r21 r22
)
=
(
r12 −r12
r12 − 1 1− r12
)
,
8that is (3.1) in the case N = 2. We assume true (3.2) for anyN ∈ N,
N > 2, therefore we have
LN+1 = DN+1 −RN+1,
that is
LN+1 =
 r1,1 + · · ·+ r1,N+1 0. . .
0 rN+1,1 + · · ·+ rN+1,N+1

−

r1,1 r1,2 . . . r1,N+1
r2,1 r2,2 . . . r2,N+1
...
...
...
...
rN+1,1 rN+1,2 . . . rN+1,N+1
 .
(3.4)
Being −ri,j = rj,i − 1 for i > j we have that the (N + 1)th row of (3.4) is
given by (
−→
h N −−→1 N , N −
N∑
i=1
ri,N+1
)
,
while we can write the (N + 1)th column as,(
−−→h TN
N −∑Ni=1 ri,N+1
)
.
Hence, if we define
(HN+1)ij =
{
ri,N+1 if i = j,
0 otherwise,
we have the first point.
(ii) It follows form the fact that the vector (1, . . . , 1) lies in the kernel of the
matrix LN .
(iii) We have to show that
N∑
i=1
(1− δi1)
(
i− 1−
i−1∑
k=1
rki
)
+
N∑
i=1
(1− δiN )
N∑
k=i+1
rik =
N(N − 1)
2
,
that is
(3.5)
N∑
i=2
(
i− 1−
i−1∑
k=1
rki
)
+
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
k=i+1
rik =
N(N − 1)
2
,
which is true in the case N = 2. Therefore, we prove by mathematical
induction that equation (3.5) holds for all N > 2. Let us define the
following objects
PN =
N∑
i=2
(
i− 1−
i−1∑
k=1
rki
)
,
QN =
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
k=i+1
rik.
9It follows that
PN+1 = PN +N −
N∑
k=1
rk(N+1),
QN+1 = QN +
N∑
k=1
rk(N+1),
thus
PN+1 +QN+1 = PN +QN +N =
N(N − 1)
2
+N =
N(N + 1)
2
,
which completes the proof.

Lemma 6. Let us consider the matrix RN under the Assumption 3, i.e. rij =
r ∈ [0, 1] for each i, j = 1, . . . N , N ≥ 2. Denoting with λN−12 , . . . , λN−1N−1 the non-
zero eigenvalues of LN−1, the expression of LN is
(3.6) LN =

(N − 1)r −r −r . . . −r
r − 1 λN−12 −r . . . −r
... . . .
. . . . . .
...
r − 1 . . . r − 1 λN−1N−1 −r
r − 1 r − 1 . . . r − 1 (N − 1)(1− r)

with eigenvalues
(3.7) λN1 = 0, λ
N
i = (i− 1)(1− r) + (N + 1− i)r, i = 2, . . . , N
Proof. In the case N = 2 we have
λ21 = 0, λ
2
2 = 1
which are eigenvalues of the matrix
L2 =
(
r −r
r − 1 1− r
)
We proceed by induction, assume the statement is true for a generic integer N − 1;
by equation (3.2) in Proposition 5 we have:
LN =
(
LN−1 +HN−1 −−→h TN−1−→
h N−1 −−→1 N−1 (N − 1)(1− r)
)
=
(
LN−1 + rIdN−1 −−→h TN−1−→
h N−1 −−→1 N−1 (N − 1)(1− r)
)
where
−→
h N−1 = [r, . . . , r︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
] and IdN−1 is the identity matrix of size N −1. Therefore,
LN assumes the form given in (3.6) for each N ≥ 2. Let us consider now λNi as in
(3.7), we prove that
det
(LN − λNi IdN) = 0, for each i = 2, . . . , N .
If i = 2, the first two rows of LN − λN2 IdN are
(3.8)
(N − 1)r − λN2 −r −r . . . −r
r − 1 λN−12 − λN2 −r . . . −r
10
with λN2 = 1− r + (N − 1)r, and the two rows in (3.8) are both equal to the array
r − 1,−r, . . . ,−r
For 2 < i+ 1 < N , we consider the ith and (i+ 1)th rows of LN −λNi IdN , given by
r − 1 . . . r − 1 λN−1i − λNi+1 −r −r . . . −r
r − 1 . . . r − 1 r − 1 λN−1i+1 − λNi+1 −r . . . −r
where
λN−1i+1 − λNi+1 = −r, λN−1i − λNi+1 = r − 1.
Thus the ith and (i + 1)th rows are linearly dependent. Finally we consider the
case i = N , we observe that the last two rows of LN − λNNIdN
r − 1 . . . r − 1 λN−1N−1 − λNN −r
r − 1 . . . r − 1 r − 1 λN−1N − λNN
are equal, in fact λN−1N−1 − λNN = r − 1 and λN−1N − λNN = −r. We have proven
that λNi , for i = 2, . . . , N defined in (3.7) are solutions of characteristic polynomial
associated to the matrix LN . 
From the Lemma 6 we can easily see that the eigenvalues (3.7) of LN are real
and positive. Further it is now easy to show that the Laplacian matrix LN defined
in (2.7), in the case described by Assumption 3, assumes the form given by the
following result.
Corollary 7. Let us consider Assumption 3 with all entries of the matrix
RN such that rij = 12 for each i, j = 1, . . . N . The Laplacian matrix LN is the
following:
(3.9) LN =

N−1
2 − 12 − 12 . . . − 12
− 12 N−12 − 12 . . . − 12
... . . .
. . . . . .
...
− 12 . . . − 12 N−12 − 12
− 12 − 12 . . . − 12 N−12
 ,
with eigenvalues
λN1 = 0, λ
N
i =
N
2
, i = 2, . . . , N.
In the following we utilize the notations LMCN and LEBN for the Laplacian matrix
under the maximum competence and equality bias case respectively as in Assump-
tion 4. The Laplacian matrix under the Assumption 3 will be denoted with L(1)N .
In the following example we establish the structures of the matrices LMCN and
LEBN . More exhaustive results are proposed in Lemma 9.
Example 8. In this example we consider four agents where i = 1, 2 have high
competence and the agents i = 3, 4 have no competence (assuming r12 = r21 =
r34 = r43 =
1
2). We denote it with Case a. Afterward, we consider the Case b,
where i = 1 has high competence and the agents i = 2, 3, 4 have no competence.
All the computations refer to the case of wide competence gap for the EB model, or
equivalently to the case c >> 1.
Case a (MC model). Let
r13 = r14 = r23 = r24 = 0, r31 = r41 = r32 = r42 = 1
11
and
r12 = r21 = r34 = r43 =
1
2
.
Hence
(3.10) LMC4 =

1
2 − 12 0 0
− 12 12 0 0
−1 −1 52 − 12
−1 −1 − 12 52

which is a matrix of triangular block form. The characteristic polynomial of LMC4
is
p
(LMC4 , λ) = p(L(1)2 , λ) · p(L(1)2 + 2Id2, λ) ,
and so the eigenvalues are {0, 1, 2, 3}. The possibility of calculate the eigenvalues
of LMC4 from those of L(1)2 , is due to a decoupling of two effects: the effect imposed
on the system by highly skilled agents, and the effect of the less competent agents.
Note that, since the first two agents are those most competent, the upper left block
in (3.11) is related to highly skilled agents (i = 1, 2) while the lower right block is
due to less competent agents (i = 3, 4).
Case a (EB model).
r13 = r14 = r23 = r24 = 1, r31 = r41 = r32 = r42 = 0
and
r12 = r21 = r34 = r43 =
1
2
.
Hence
(3.11) LEB4 =

5
2 − 12 −1 −1
− 12 52 −1 −1
0 0 12 − 12
0 0 − 12 12

which is a matrix of triangular block form. The characteristic polynomial of LEB4
is
p
(LEB4 , λ) = p(L(1)2 + 2Id2, λ) · p(L(1)2 , λ) ,
and so the eigenvalues are still {0, 1, 2, 3}. As for MC model, we can observe again
the decoupling of the effect imposed on the system by highly skilled agents from those
of the less competent agents.
Case b (MC model).
r12 = r13 = r14 = 0, r21 = r31 = r41 = 1
and
r11 = r22 = r23 = r24 = r32 = r33 = r34 = r42 = r43 = r44 =
1
2
.
12
Then
LMC4 =

0 0 0 0
−1 2 − 12 − 12
−1 − 12 2 − 12
−1 − 12 − 12 2

.
The characteristic polynomial of LMC4 is
p
(LMC4 , λ) = λ p(L(1)3 + Id3, λ) ,
whose eigenvalues are {0, 1, 52 , 52}.
Case b (EB model).
r12 = r13 = r14 = 1, r21 = r31 = r41 = 0
and
r11 = r22 = r23 = r24 = r32 = r33 = r34 = r42 = r43 = r44 =
1
2
.
Hence
LEB4 =

3 −1 −1 −1
0 1 − 12 − 12
0 − 12 1 − 12
0 − 12 − 12 1

.
The characteristic polynomial of LEB4 is
p
(LEB4 , λ) = (λ− 3) p(L(1)3 , λ) ,
whose eigenvalues are {0, 32 , 32 , 3}.
In the following Lemma we generalize this approach denoting with N1 the
number of incompetent agents which may vary in time. Besides, we recall the
notation introduced with Proposition 5:
−→
h N−1 = [r1,N , . . . , rN−1,N ],
−→
1 N−1 =
[1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
],
−→
0 N−1 = [0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
]), and HN−1 is the diagonal matrix defined in (3.3).
From the Lemma 6 we can easily see that the eigenvalues (3.7) of LN are real
and positive. Further it is now easy to show that the Laplacian matrix LN defined
in (2.7), in the case described by Assumption 4, assumes the form given by the
following result.
Lemma 9. Under Assumption 4 let us consider a system of N+N1 ∈ N, N ≥ 1,
N1 ≥ 1 interacting agents such that S = {1, . . . , N} and U = {N + 1, . . . , N +
N1}. We define the following rectangular matrices J ∈ MatN−N1,N1({1}),O ∈
MatN1,N−N1({0}), i.e.
(J )ij = 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N −N1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N1,
(O)ij = 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N −N1.
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Then, in the case c >> 1, we have the following claims:
(i) The Laplacian matrix for the MC model is given by
(3.12) LMCN+N1 =
(
L(1)N O
−J L(1)N1 +NIdN1
)
its characteristic polynomial is given by
(3.13) p
(LMCN+N1 , λ) = p(L(1)N , λ) · p(L(1)N1 +N IdN1 , λ) .
with eigenvalues:
λ1 = 0, λ2 = · · · = λN = N
2
,
λN+1 = N, λN+2 = · · · = λN+N1 =
N1
2
+N,
(ii) The Laplacian matrix for the EB model is given by
(3.14) LEBN+N1 =
(
L(1)N +N1IdN −J
O L(1)N1
)
its characteristic polynomial is given by
(3.15) p
(LEBN+N1 , λ) = p(L(1)N +N1 IdN , λ) · p(L(1)N1 , λ)
with eigenvalues
λ1 = N1, λ2 = · · · = λN = N
2
+N1,
λN+1 = · · · = λN+N1−1 =
N1
2
, λN+N1 = 0.
Proof. (i) We proceed by induction. Let us consider N1 = 1, therefore
S = {i = 1, . . . , N} and U = {N + 1}. From Proposition 5, eq. (3.2), we
have
LMCN+1 =
L
(1)
N +HN −
−→
h TN
−→
h N −−→1 N N −
∑N
i=1 ri N+1

where ri, N+1 = 0, for each i = 1, . . . , N . Hence LMCN+1 assumes the follow-
ing form
LMCN+1 =
L
(1)
N + IdN
−→
0 TN
−−→1 N N

The first step has been showed. Let us assume that the results in (3.12)
and (3.13) hold. We add another incompetent agent such that: S =
14
{1, . . . , N }, U = {N + 1, . . . , N +N1 + 1}. From Proposition 5 we have
LMCN+N1+1 =

 L
(1)
N O
−J L(1)N1 +NIdN1
+HN+N1 −−→h TN+N1
−→
h N+N1 −
−→
1 N+N1 N +N1 −
∑N+N1
i=1 ri, N+N1+1
 ,
where
r1,N+N1+1 = · · · = rN,N+N1+1 = 0
rN+1,N+N1+1 = · · · = rN+N1,N+N1+1 =
1
2
,
and so L
(1)
N O
−J L(1)N1 +NIdN1
+HN+N1 =
 L
(1)
N O
−J L(1)N1 +
(
N + 12
)
IdN1
 .
Rows −−→h N+N1 and
−→
h N+N1 −
−→
1 N+N1 are respectively given by
0 , . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
,−1
2
, . . . , −1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
−1 , . . . , −1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
,−1
2
, . . . , −1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
,
while
N +N1 −
N+N1∑
i=1
ri, N+N1+1 = N +
N1
2
.
From Corollary 7, the main diagonal of L
(1)
N1
contains all N1−12 , hence the
inductive step is proved.
(ii) We proceed by induction. Let us consider N1 = 1, therefore S =
{1, . . . , N} and U = {N + 1}. From Proposition 5, eq. (3.2), we have
LEBN+1 =
L
(1)
N +HN −
−→
h TN
−→
h N −−→1 N N −
∑N
i=1 ri N+1

where ri N+1 = 1, for each i = 1, . . . , N . Hence LEBN+1 assumes the follow-
ing form
LEBN+1 =
L
(1)
N + IdN −
−→
1 TN
−→
0 N 0

The base step is achieved. Suppose the result (3.12) and (3.13) holds. We
add another incompetent agent: S = {1, . . . , N }, U = {N + 1, . . . , N +
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N1 + 1}. We have, from Proposition 5, eq. (3.2), LEBN+N1+1 =
 L
(1)
N +N1 IN −JN,N1
ON1,N L(1)N1
+HN+N1 −−→h TN+N1
−→
h N+N1 −
−→
1 N+N1 N +N1 −
∑N+N1
i=1 ri,N+N1+1
 ,
where
r1,N+N1+1 = · · · = rN,N+N1+1 = 1
rN+1,N+N1+1 = · · · = rN+N1,N+N1+1 =
1
2
.
Therefore we have L
(1)
N +N1 IN −JN,N1
ON1,N L(1)N1
+HN+N1 =
=
 L
(1)
N + (N1 + 1) IN −JN,N1
ON1,N L(1)N1 + 12IN1
 .
Rows −−→h N+N1 and
−→
h N+N1 −
−→
1 N+N1 are, respectively:
−1 , . . . , −1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
,−1
2
, . . . , −1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
0 , . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
,−1
2
, . . . , −1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
,
while
N +N1 −
N+N1∑
i=1
ri,N+N1+1 =
N1
2
.
From Corollary 7, the main diagonal of L(1)N1 contains all N1−12 , hence
L(1)N1 +
1
2
IN1 = L(1)N1+1
and we can conclude.

We notice that, in Lemma 9, the zero-eigenvalue appears in the spectrum of L(1)N
for the MC model and in the spectrum of L(1)N1 for the EB model. The matrix L
(1)
N
is associated to the set S of competent agents while the matrix L(1)N1 is associated
to the set U of incompetent agents. In the following result we will prove how at
each time t > 0 the EB model leads the system toward suboptimal decisions with
respect to the optimal one given by the MC model at a fixed time. As we see in
the following theorem, the zero-eigenvalue controls the asymptotic behavior of the
system.
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Theorem 10. Let us consider a system of N + N1 ∈ N, N ≥ 1, N1 ≥ 1
interacting agents, such that at a given time S = {1, . . . , N} is the set of competent
agents and U = {N + 1, . . . , N +N1} is the set of not competent agents. In case of
interaction function in Assumption 4 at each t > 0 the collective decision in case
of EB is not optimal.
Proof. Let us observe that for all N > 1 we have dim(KerL(1)N ) = 1, in fact,
the (N − 1) × (N − 1) top left minor in (3.9) has non zero determinant, while
det(L(1)N ) = 0 for each N . Thus, the rank of L(1)N is N − 1.
In the following we denote with ma(λ) and mg(λ) the algebraic and the geo-
metric multiplicity of eigenvalue λ. Now we can prove that the matrix LEBN+N1 is
diagonalizable.
In Lemma 9 we have shown that the eigenvalues of LEBN+N1 are λ1 = · · · =
λN−1 = N2 +N1, λN = N1, λN+1 = · · · = λN+N1−1 = N12 and λN+N1 = 0.
• Case mg(0) = ma(0) = 1. Notice that λ = 0 belongs also to the spectrum
of L(1)N1 , dim(KerL
(1)
N1
) = 1 and (1, . . . , 1) ∈ KerL(1)N1 . Further we have that
det
(
L(1)N +N1IdN
)
6= 0 and thus dim(KerLEBN+N1) = 1.
• Case mg
(
N1
2
)
= ma
(
N1
2
)
= N1 − 1. We have:
LEBN+N1 −
N1
2
IdN+N1 =
(
L(1)N + N12 IdN −J
O L(1)N1 − N12 IdN1
)
,
where dim Ker
(
L(1)N1 − N12 IdN1
)
= N1 − 1 and det
(
L(1)N + N12 IdN
)
6= 0.
Therefore we have
dim Ker
(
LEBN+N1 −
N1
2
IdN+N1
)
= N1 − 1.
• Case mg (N1) = ma (N1) = 1. Let us consider
LEBN+N1 −N1 IdN+N1 =
(
L(1)N −J
O L(1)N1 −N1IdN1
)
,
where the eigenvalues of L(1)N1 −N1IdN1 are −N1 and −N12 , thus det(L
(1)
N1
−N1IdN1) 6= 0. Moreover, dim(KerL(1)N ) = 1 and (1, . . . , 1) ∈ KerL(1)N .
Accordingly dim Ker
(
LEBN+N1 −N1 IdN+N1
)
= 1.
• Case mg
(
N
2 +N1
)
= ma
(
N
2 +N1
)
= N−1. We now consider the matrix
LEBN+N1 −
(
N
2
+N1
)
IdN+N1
=
(
L(1)N − N2 IdN −J
O L(1)N1 −
(
N
2 +N1
)
IdN1
)
,
where det
(
L(1)N1 −
(
N
2 +N1
)
IdN1
)
6= 0 and dim Ker
(
L(1)N − N2 IdN
)
=
N − 1. We have shown
dim Ker
(
LEBN+N1 −
(
N
2
+N1
)
IdN+N1
)
= N − 1 .
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The solution of the system of differential equations (2.3) is equivalent to a diagonal
system with diagonal entries given by the eigenvalues in Lemma 9. Therefore, the
collective decision in the EB case is not optimal. 
Remark 11. Observe that the case N1 = 0 is encompassed in Corollary 7
where, under Assumption 3, all entries of the matrix RN are rij = 12 for each
i, j = 1, . . . N .
4. Numerics
In this section we present several numerical results in order to show the main
features of the system (2.3) under the hypotheses of maximum competence and
equality bias. We consider a set of N = 20 agents, forming an interacting decision-
making system. Therefore, we compare the emerging asymptotic collective decisions
in the cMC and EB regimes for several c ≥ 1.
For what it may concern the evolution of the competence variable we consider
a background variable z ∈ R+ with uniform distribution C(z) ∼ U([0, 1]). Fur-
ther, the interaction function λ(xi, xj) introduced in (2.3), representing the possi-
ble learning processes of low skilled agents through the interaction with the more
competent agents, is supposed to be
(4.1) λ(xi, xj) =
{
λ¯ xi < xj ,
0 xi ≥ xj .
The numerics have been performed in the case λ¯ = λB = 10
−2. The ODE
system (2.3) has been solved through the RK4 method by considering both for
competence and decision the time step ∆t = 10−2 and the final time Tf = 10.
The interaction terms of the evolving decision have been chosen of the form (2.4)
with Q(wi, wj) = 1 and R(xi, xj) describing the cMC and EB cases for increasing
values of the parameter c > 0.
We consider a multi-agent system characterized at t = 0 by decisions strongly
clustered: the most competent agent with uniform distribution in w ∈ [−1,−0.75],
x ∈ [0.75, 1] and the less skilled agents with uniform distribution w ∈ [0.75, 1],
x ∈ [0, 0.25]. In all the tests the two populations of competent/incompetent agents
are supposed to be of equal size. In Figure 2 and in Figure 3 we compare the
evolution of the system in the cMC case (blue line) and in the EB case (orange
dashed line). The results are presented for c = 1, 5, 10. We can observe how the
collective decision of the system strongly diverges in the case of EB with respect
to the optimal decision, given by cMC model with c >> 1. A further evidence of
the emerging suboptimality is given in Figure 4 where we depict the asymptotic
collective decision of the multi-agent system evolving in the cMC and EB cases and
an increasing c = 1, . . . , 10.
Conclusions
We introduced microscopic models of interacting multi-agent systems for the
description of decision-making processes inspired by the experimental results in
[7, 24]. The introduction of the bias is here analytically studied at the level of
the Laplacian matrix. We explicitly calculated the structure of the eigenvalues of
the Laplacian matrix under under simplified assumptions both in the maximum
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Figure 2. Evolution of the variable w ∈ [−1, 1], representing the
decision of each agents, in the cases cMC and EB with increasing
c > 0, N = 20. The blue traits represent the evolution of the
system in case of cMC interactions, whereas the orange dashed
trait describe the evolution of the system under EB. We considered
∆t = 10−2, Tf = 10, λ¯ = λB = 10−2, solving the ODE system
through RK4.
competence and in the equality bias case. The suboptimality of the collective
decision under equality bias with respect to the maximum competence case is then
established for each time step. Numerical results show that the equality bias impairs
the emergence of the decision of the most competent agents of the system.
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